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WILDCAT STRIKES: THE AFFIRMATIVE
DUTY OF THE PARENT UNION TO
INTERVENE
I. Introduction
Most collective labor agreements contain a no-strike clause,1 a
promise by the union that it will not authorize a strike in the bar-
gaining unit for the life of the contract.2 The no-strike clause is
usually considered to be the quid pro quo for an agreement by the
employer to arbitrate workers' grievances arising under the con-
tract because the employer relinquishes some managerial auton-
omy in return for a promise of uninterrupted work.3 Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley
Act)4 was enacted in part to preserve this quid pro quo, thereby
encouraging parties to agree to arbitrate grievances as an alterna-
tive to the economic ravages of strikes.' Under section 301, "parent
unions,"6 as parties to collective bargaining contracts,7 are subject
to liability for damages in federal court for breach of no-strike
agreements. A parent union, however, cannot be held liable to an
1. Bureau of National Affairs, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 90 (8th ed. 1975)
(91% of the labor contracts in a national sampling contained some form of a no-strike
pledge).
2. No-strike clauses vary in scope according to the specific terms of the clause. See notes
39, 143-147 infra and accompanying text.
3. See Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962);
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
5. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report] and notes 25-30 infra and accompanying text.
6. The term "parent union" denotes the national or international labor organization
which charters local affiliates. See generally Comment, Parent Union Liability for Strikes
in Breach of Contract, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1028 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Parent Union
Liability].
7. The parent union usually must be a party signatory to the collective bargaining agree-
ment as well as the bargaining agent in order to be liable for a breach of its terms. See
Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1034 n.49; Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions'
Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 IND. L. J. 472, 477 n.28 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wild-
cat Strikes]. But see Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp.
158, 167-68 (W.D. Pa. 1973), modified, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
935 (1976) (where a contract with the employer was signed only by the locals and a National
Committee, the National Committee was deemed to be an agent of the International in
signing the contract).
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employer for a work stoppage not authorized or ratified by it.'
Such unauthorized work stoppages are commonly referred to as
wildcat strikes.' Although wildcatting local affiliates can be sued
for breach of a no-strike clause, lack of assets to satisfy a judge-
ment very often precludes this as an effective remedy.10 In addi-
tion, an injunction is not always available for strikes in breach of
contract." Moreover, where an injunction is granted, it may not be
obeyed.' 2 Thus, the lack of an effectve remedy for damages caused
by a wildcat strike seriously undermines the grievance procedure
by eroding the stability of the no-strike-arbitration exchange."
Recently, the Supreme Court held in Carbon Fuel Co. v. United
Mine Workers, that a no-strike clause implied no obligation on the
part of the parent union to take affirmative steps to end unautho-
rized work stoppages by some of its local unions." Although the
Court recognized the importance of favoring arbitration in inter-
preting labor contracts, 5 it emphasized the need for maintaining
free collective bargaining and held that "the parties' agreement
primarily determines their [contractual] relationship."'Is Thus, in
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(b), (e) (1976). See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212, 217-18
(1979); United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955); and notes 65-66 infra and accompanying text.
9. The term "wildcat strike" is generally used to denote only work stoppages in deroga-
tion of the authority of both local and parent union officials. It has also been used to include
strikes supported by local officials but not authorized or ratified by the parent union. E.g.,
Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979). This latter definition will be employed here.
10. See Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1033-34; Wildcat Strikes, supra note 7,
at 476 n.23.
11. Only strikes arising out of grievances which are subject to arbitration are enjoinable.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (The Court held
that a sympathy strike was not enjoinable where the underlying grievance was not subject to
arbitration); accord, J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, Local 598, 568 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.
1978); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1976).
Also, an employer remains uncompensated for lost production due to unauthorized work
stoppages where there is no effective damage remedy.
12. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 517 F.2d 1348, 1348 (4th Cir. 1975); Old Ben
Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 500 F.2d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 1974); Peabody Coal Co. v.
Local 1734, UMW, 484 F.2d 78, 80 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Bethle-
hem Mines Corp. v. UMW, 476 F.2d 860, 862 (3d Cir. 1973).
13. See Edwards & Bergmann, The Legal and Practical Remedies Available to Employ-
ers to Enforce a Contractual "No-Strike" Commitment, 21 LAB. L.J. 3, 5-6 (1970) and note
27 infra and accompanying text.
14. 444 U.S. 212, 218-21 (1979).
15. Id. at 218-19.
16. Id. at 219. It was noted by the Court that because the parties had deleted from the
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the absence of an express contractual obligation on the part of the
parent union to attempt to end unauthorized work stoppages, the
Court refused to impose such a duty.
In a subsequent decision, however, the Sixth Circuit in United
Steelworkers of America v. Lorain held that a no-strike provision
which included an express promise to "actively discourage and en-
deavor to . . . terminate" all strikes did not create a duty on the
part of the international union to attempt to end a wildcat strike.'7
The Sixth Circuit found this language not specific enough to create
liability for damages. Rather, the court held that the contract's
general exculpatory clause" controlled the extent of the union's
obligations under the no-strike clause. 9 This interpretation of the
contract is contrary to the construction of similar no-strike clauses
by other courts.2 0 It is also inconsistent with the goals of Congress
in enacting section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act2' and the rules
fashioned in light of these policies by federal courts, including the
Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel, for the construction of labor
contracts.22
This Note will examine the legislative goals of Section 301 and
the implementation of these goals by the courts. Further, it will be
argued that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Lorain diverges from
these well-recognized goals. Specifically, it will be argued that 1)
an express covenant creating a duty on the part of the parent
union to take affirmative steps toward ending an unauthorized
work stoppage should be enforced given the underlying policies of
congressional labor legislation; 2) the Lorain court improperly con-
contract in force a provision requiring the union to exercise its "best efforts" to end work
stoppages, which was present in prior agreements, the parties intended that there would no
longer be such a duty. Id. at 219-22.
17. 616 F.2d 919, 921-22 (6th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3018 (May
6, 1980) (No. 80-56).
18. See notes 127-30 infra and accompanying text.
19. 616 F.2d at 922.
20. See Latas Libby's, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 609 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1979); Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974); Airco
Speer Carbon-Graphite v. Local 502, 494 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Pa. 1980); notes 132-47 infra
and accompanying text.
21. See Senate Report, supra note 5, at 16-18; notes 23-30 infra and accompanying text.
22. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Local 174,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also notes 41-64 infra and accompanying text.
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strued the no-strike agreement, particularly in light of these con-
gressional policies; and 3) enforcement of an affirmative duty to
end wildcat strikes would not undermine the union's position as
the representative of its membership.
II. Historical Perspective: The Taft-Hartley Act
The Taft-Hartley Act, enacted in 1947, has been described as
"retributive" because it was spawned in part by a wave of strikes
occurring in 1946.23 Section 30124 was intended by Congress to pro-
vide a remedy for employers in federal court when a collective bar-
gaining agreement was breached by a union,25 in order to "promote
23. J. SHISTER, B. AARON, & C. SUMMERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 10
(1962) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY]. Prior to the enactment of § 301, state courts
had exclusive jurisdiction over suits for breach of collective labor agreements and state law
determined the substantive law and the remedies available. Execution of a remedy in dam-
ages was difficult since a union was not treated as a legal entity. The enforceability of collec-
tive bargaining agreements was uncertain. The prevailing views concerning the enforceabil-
ity of labor contracts included: (1) considering them to have no legal effect, (2) regarding
them as legal obligations running directly from employees to the employer, and (3) viewing
the employees as third party beneficiaries of the promises made by the employer to the
union. The lack of consistent and effective legislation concerning the enforceability of collec-
tive labor agreements against unions was the major impetus for the drafting of § 301. See A.
Cox, D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 646-47 (1977). See also
Senate Report, supra note 5, at 15.
24. Section 301 provides in relevant part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce ...shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization
may sue or be sued as an entity . . . in the courts of the United States. Any money
judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be
enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall
not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as
an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts,
the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subse-
quently ratified shall not be controlling.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
25. See Senate Report, supra note 5, at 17. "Statutory recognition of the collective bar-
gaining agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary
step. It will promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements,
and will thereby promote industrial peace."
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and make effective agreements not to strike."26 Congress recog-
nized that,
[ilf Unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such agree-
ments do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. . . .The chief advantage
which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective agreement is as-
surance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the agreement. With-
out some effective method of assuring freedom from economic warfare...
there is little reason why an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
27
Providing a remedy to employers for the breach of no-strike
clauses fosters collective bargaining agreements which make the
employer's promise to arbitrate labor's grievances the quid pro quo
for forfeiting the right to strike. The promise to arbitrate has been
called the "primary vehicle for the promotion of industrial
peace. '28 It is a system "designed to aid management in its quest
for efficiency, to assist union leadership in its participation in the
enterprise, and to secure justice for the employees. It is a means of
making collective bargaining work .... -29 Thus, the intention of
Congress in enacting section 301 was to encourage the making of
these quid pro quo agreements and ultimately "to promote indus-
trial peace through faithful performance by the parties." 30
Another important policy which must be considered with, and in
some cases, balanced against the policy of promoting industrial
peace, is the notion that collective bargaining should remain free
from governmental interference and that the intent of the parties
should be paramount in enforcing labor contracts." Free and vol-
untary collective bargaining is a "fundamental premise" of federal
26. Id. at 16-18.
27. Id. at 16.
28. W. CONNOLLY & B. CONNOLLY, WORK STOPPAGES AND UNION REPSONSIBILITY 3 (1977).
See also United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
29. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024
(1955).
30. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 16. "[The] basic policy which, while not articulated,
underlies the federal labor statutes ... that economic warfare as the method for resolving
labor disputes is primitive, barbaric, and-most important-wasteful, not only to the dispu-
tants, but also to the community." PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 133. See also United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. at 578.
31. "[I1n labor relations there is a freedom of contract ideal. It is that the parties should
be free to write their own terms and conditions of employment. Inevitably, some tension
exists, at least in the short run, between freedom of contract and industrial peace." Welling-
ton, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 14 LAB. L.J. 1016, 1017
(1963).
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labor legislation.3 2 In section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, Con-
gress defined collective bargaining as "the mutual obligation ...
[to] confer in good faith . . . but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
"133concession ... .
Underlying congressional protection of free and voluntary deter-
mination of the terms and conditions of employment by the parties
was the realization that industrial peace "rests upon freedom, not
restraint. '34 Indeed the survival and success of the collective bar-
gaining process depends upon its attractiveness and utility to the
parties involved. 5 Courts must refrain from general policy pro-
nouncements which do not give due regard to the intent of the
parties. 36
The proper approach in construing the no-strike clause must be
a realistic assessment of what the parties intended.3 7 "[I]f the rule
of construction is unrelated to the sense of the collective agree-
ment, the rule substitutes governmental decision-making for pri-
vate decision-making and is therefore an inescapable interference
with freedom of contract."3 8 The no-strike clause is "a point to be
bargained over" and it can be entirely omitted or be as broad or as
narrow in scope as the parties decide in their agreement.3 9 Thus,
courts should consider the specific language of the no-strike
pledge"' as well as the relevant labor policies in construing collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
32. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. at 219; Gateway
Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S.
272 (1972); H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. at 106.
34. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 199, 217 (1960) (quoting a speech by Senator Wagner). "Freedom of contract in the
form of free collective bargaining may, from the perspective of history, be more productive
of peaceful industrial relations than its alternatives. Wellington, supra note 31, at
1017.
35. See generally Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Reflections].
36. See Wildcat Strikes, supra note 7, at 479-80. See generally Carbon Fuel Co. v.
UMW, 444 U.S. at 218-22.
37. Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 497 F.2d at 891.
38. Wellington, supra note 31, at 1026. See H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. at 108;
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. at 287.
39. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 18.
40. See Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 497 F.2d at 891.
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III. Judicial Interpretation of Congressional Policies
A. Judicial Sanction of the Quid Pro Quo Agreement
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,4 1 a labor union
sought to enforce the arbitration provision of a collective bargain-
ing agreement against an employer. The Supreme Court held that
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act was more than merely a grant
of jurisdiction to federal courts.42 In addition, "it authorizes fed-
eral courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
• . .collective bargaining agreements. . ."s The Court further
held that problems lacking express statutory sanction "will be
solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a
remedy that will effectuate that policy."4 ' Relying upon the con-
gressional policies of favoring arbitration of labor disputes' 5 and of
promoting agreements not to strike,' the Court granted an order
for specific performance of the terms of the contract. In subse-
quent decisions, the Court similarly favored enforcement of the
quid pro quo exchange by giving "generous scope" to both the
promise by management to arbitrate grievances and the promise
by the union not to strike. In so doing, the Court fashioned rules of
construction of collective bargaining agreements which promote in-
dustrial peace.' 7
In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co.,48 the Court was again faced with an employer's refusal to
41. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
42. Id. at 451-52.
43. Id. at 451.
44. Id. at 457.
45. Id. at 458-59.
46. "Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an
agreement not to strike. . . . [Section 301] expresses a federal policy that federal courts
should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that indus-
trial peace can be best obtained only in that way." Id. at 455 (emphasis in original).
47. Wellington, supra note 31, at 1027. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368
(1974); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Local 174, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
48. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). Warrior is the leading case in a group of three related decisions
commonly referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy. See also United Steelworkers of America
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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arbitrate. The union contended that the employer breached the
collective bargaining agreement by contracting out to other compa-
nies maintenance work previously done by its employees and re-
quested that the dispute be arbitrated according to the contract. 9
The employer refused, arguing that the decision to contract out
work was "strictly a function of management" which, according to
the agreement, was not subject to arbitration.5 0 The Court noted
that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be re-
quired to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed so to submit. 5 1 The Court held, however, that the dispute
was subject to arbitration, stating that "[d]oubts [as to the scope
of the arbitration clause] should be resolved in favor of cover-
age."5 2 The Court relied on the policy expressed in Lincoln Mills
that "[a] major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion
of a provision for arbitration. ... 58
In addition to the enforcement of promises by employers to arbi-
trate employee grievances, the Supreme Court has broadly con-
strued the concomitant promise of labor not to strike. In Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, a collective bargaining agree-
ment contained a promise by an employer to arbitrate all grievance
disputes and a promise by the union not to strike." The union,
however, called a strike rather than submit a particular grievance
to arbitration. After weighing the various elements of congressional
labor policy,55 the Court granted the employer an injunction. The
Court expressed particular concern for maintaining the viability of
the quid pro quo exchange.' Considering the effect its holding
49. 363 U.S. at 575-76.
50. Id. at 577.
51. Id. at 582.
52. Id. at 583. Accord, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. at 379-80; United States
Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236, 1242 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1119 (3d Cir.
1975); Willo Packing Co. v. Butchers, Food Handlers, and Allied Workers Union, 450 F.
Supp. 598, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
53. 363 U.S. at 578.
54. 398 U.S. 235, 239 (1970).
55. Id. at 241. The Court balanced the congressional policy of promoting arbitration
against the policy underlying the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. § 104 (1976), which restricts labor injunctions by federal courts. Id.
56. The Court stated in Boy's Market that:
[the lack of an effective remedy) seriously undermined the effectiveness of the arbi-
tration technique as a method peacefully to resolve industrial disputes. . . . Clearly
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would have on labor unions, the Court concluded, "[t]he growth
and viability of labor organizations is hardly retarded - if any-
thing this goal is advanced - by a remedial device that merely
enforces the obligation that the union freely undertook. . . ."In Local 174, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co.,58 the Supreme Court again sought to uphold the quid
pro quo exchange. In Lucas Flour the contract provided for
mandatory arbitration of all disputes, but contained no express no-
strike provision.9 The union called a strike over the concededly
arbitrable issue of whether an employee had been discharged for
good cause without resorting to the arbitration procedure. 0 The
employer brought an action against the union for damages caused
by the strike. The Court held that the agreement to arbitrate im-
plied a promise not to strike over an arbitrable issue during the life
of the contract. 1 The Court based its holding on the policies of
industrial peace and freedom of contract 2 and stated that "the ba-
sic policy of national labor legislation [is] to promote the arbitral
process as a substitute for economic warfare." s The Court also
concluded: "[t]o hold otherwise would obviously do violence to ac-
cepted principles of traditional contract law."""
Thus the Supreme Court has consistently enforced the compli-
mentary obligations of the quid pro quo exchange where they have
been freely undertaken. Moreover, the Court has demonstrated a
employers will be wary of assuming obligations to arbitrate specifically enforceable
against them when no similarly efficacious remedy is available to enforce the concom-
itant undertaking of the union to refrain from striking.
398 U.S. at 252.
57. Id.
58. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
59. Id. at 96.
60. Id. at 97.
61. Id. at 104-05. Accord, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. at 379-80 (A no-strike
clause must be implied where an arbitrable issue is involved. "Otherwise the employer
would be deprived of his bargain and the policy of the labor statutes to implement private
resolution of disputes in a manner agreed upon would seriously suffer.") But see Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. at 410 (Where an express no-strike
clause is lacking, a mandatory arbitration clause does not imply a promise not to engage in a
sympathy strike where neither its cause nor the issues underlying it were subject to the
grievance settlement procedure provided for in the contract.).
62. 369 U.S. at 104-05. See Wellington, supra note 28, at 1031.
63. 369 U.S. at 105.
64. Id.
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willingness to fashion rules of construction with regard to these
provisions which foster the legislative goal of industrial peace.
B. Theories of Parent Union Liability Under Section 301
Under section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, a union can be
held liable only for the acts of its agents." Section 301(e) provides
that the common law of agency applies in determining whether an
individual is acting as an agent for the union.6 In adopting the
common law agency test, Congress followed the Coronado Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers rule that union liability depends upon
proof "that what was done was done by their agents in accordance
with their fundamental agreement of association. '67 Following the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, a number of courts,
in an effort to promote the goal of fostering industrial peace, held
unions liable for unauthorized strikes by invoking one or both of
two theories which conflict with the rules of strict agency; the
''mass action" theory and the "implied duty of reasonable efforts."
The mass action theory in effect held a union responsible where
its members struck en masse in breach of contract, even though
the strike was not formally authorized by any union official. 8 This
theory was first applied in United States v. United Mine Workers
where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held the
mine workers union liable for a simultaneous nationwide strike be-
cause "men don't act collectively without leadership."69 In Eazor
65. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976). See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. at 216; UMW v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736 (1966); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695, 701 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Peabody Coal Co. v. Local Unions, 543 F.2d 10, 12
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); North American Coal Co. v. UMW, 497
F.2d 459, 466-67 (6th Cir. 1974); United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d
872, 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1976). See Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 430 F.2d 446, 457 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971) (The acts of a
general union agent are binding upon the union regardless of whether it was specifically
authorized or ratified by it and where the local and parent union act in concert, they are
each liable for the acts of each other's agent as well as those of their own). United Textile
Workers v. Newberry Mills, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 366, 373 (W.D.S.C. 1965) (overt actions of
union officers in their official capacity constitute authorization or ratification); accord, Car-
bon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. at 216-17; UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736 (1966).
67. 268 U.S. 295, 304 (1925).
68. See W. CONNOLLY & B. CONNOLLY, supra note 28, at 284.
69. 77 F. Supp. 563, 564 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 871 (1949).
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Express, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,70 the
theory was again used to impute liability to a union for an unau-
thorized strike: "[M]ass action by union members must realisti-
cally be regarded as union action. The premise is that large groups
of men do not act collectively without leadership and that a func-
tioning union must be held responsible for the mass action of its
members. 71
The other theory used by a number of courts to impute liability
to unions for wildcat strikes was that a promise not to strike im-
plied a duty on the part of the union to use all reasonable means to
end a strike. Failure to satisfy this implied obligation rendered the
union liable to the employer for breach of contract. This theory
was also used by the court in Eazor72 where members of two local
unions staged a wildcat strike over a grievance involving the dis-
charge of two union members. The strike was concededly in breach
of the contract which prohibited strikes without first resorting to
arbitration.73 In addition to its mass action rationale, the Third
Circuit found the union liable although the union did not authorize
the strike and, in fact urged its members back to work, because it
had failed to take all reasonable steps available to end the strike.7 '
The court stated: "[n]ecessarily implied in the unions' agreement
that there should be no strike was an obligation on their part to
use every reasonable means to bring to an end a strike begun by
their members without their authorization. 7 5 It also found that
the no-strike clause would be "illusory" if best efforts weren't im-
plied 7 6 and that failure to take such steps indicated "passive ac-
quiesence in the strike. '77
70. 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976).
71. Id. at 963. Accord United Textile Workers v. Newberry Mills, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 366
(W.D.S.C. 1965), Wagner Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 496 F.2d 954
(8th Cir. 1974); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 430 F.2d 446 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971).
72. 520 F.2d at 959-60. Accord, Bituminous Coal Operators, Inc. v. UMW, 585 F.2d 586
(3d Cir. 1978); Republic Steel Corp. v. UMW, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978); United States
Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. International
Union of Elec. Workers, 496 F.2d at 956.
73. 520 F.2d at 955.
74. Id. at 959.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 960.
77. Id. at 964. Possible steps suggested by the court to fulfill this implied affirmative
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In invoking both the mass action theory and the doctrine of an
implied duty of reasonable efforts, the Eazor court sought to fulfill
the goals of Congress to foster the arbitration process as an alter-
native to economic strife 8 and to promote and make effective the
corresponding promise not to strike.7 The court also asserted that
the "basic goal of Congress [was] to promote industrial peace."8
C. Carbon Fuel
Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers,81 effectively refuted
both of the theories relied upon by the Eazor court.82 Carbon Fuel
involved a collective bargaining agreement which contained a
promise by the union to settle all disputes through arbitration 8
and to "maintain the integrity of [the] contract. . ... 8' Three lo-
cal unions engaged in a total of forty-eight work stoppages against
an employer which were unauthorized by the parent union and in
breach of the collective bargaining contract.85 Thirty-one of the
strikes were held by the Fourth Circuit to be a breach of the con-
tract by the local unions. With respect to these strikes, the Fourth
Circuit ostensibly applied the mass action theory to find the three
local unions liable. The court, however, stated that the mass action
theory, "properly applied," limited liability to the local unions
duty include removal or discipline of wildcat leaders, suspension and fining of striking mem-
bers, establishing a secret ballot vote to return to work, and placing the local in temporary
trusteeship. See also notes 193-202 infra and accompanying text.
78. 520 F.2d at 963.
79. Id. The implied obligation "effectuates the intent of Congress in enacting section
301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act 'to promote and make effective agreements not to strike.'"
Id. (quoting from Senate Report, supra note 5, at 16).
80. Id.
81. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
82. Id. at 217-18. See also Lakeshore Motor Freight Co. v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 483 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (Carbon Fuel "diffused" the mass action
theory).
83. 444 U.S. at 216. The promise to arbitrate grievances implies a concomitant promise
not to strike over an arbitrable issue. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
84. 444 U.S. at 216.
85. Id. at 213. The employer sought damages from the parent union for losses caused by
the wildcat strikes. The Fourth Circuit held that 17 of the 48 work stoppages were sympa-
thy strikes and that strikes not the result of a dispute between the union and the company
were not in breach of the promise not to strike implied from the union's promise to arbi-
trate all disputes. 582 F.2d at 1348. The court cited Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelwork-
ers of America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). See note 61 supra.
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which had participated in. the strike." The court refused to impute
liability to the parent union "absent a showing of complicity on the
part of a larger union entity ... - Essentially, the court applied
strict principles of agency." It recognized that because all mem-
bers of the locals, including the local officers, participated in the
strikes, the locals should be deemed to have authorized the
strikes,89 but because no agent of the parent union authorized, sup-
ported, or ratified the strike, no liability could be imputed to the
parent union. °
The Fourth Circuit also examined the bargaining history of the
parties to determine whether the parent union could be held liable
for breach of an implied duty of affirmative efforts. It noted that a
"best efforts" clause contained in a previous agreement had been
deleted in subsequent contracts and that the agreement in force at
the time of the strikes contained no provision imposing an affirma-
tive duty to attempt to end strikes on the part of the union.9 1 The
court concluded that an implied affirmative duty "[fin light of the
bargaining history ... rewrites the terms of the contract upon
which the parties had agreed,"' 2 and thus, could not be imposed in
this instance.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's holding that
the parent union did not authorize or ratify the strikes by its locals
and was not obligated under the contract to attempt to end the
strikes.'3 Referring to the imputation of liability on the part of the
parent union for the mass action of three of its locals, Justice
Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, stated, "Congress limited
the responsibility of unions for strikes in breach of contract to
cases when the union may be found responsible according to the
common-law rule of agency."" The Court cited section 301(b)
86. 582 F.2d at 1349-50.
87. Id. at 1349 (quoting United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063, 1074 (3d Cir.
1976)).
88. 582 F.2d at 1349. See note 66 supra.
89. Id. at 1350.
90. Id. at 1349.
91. Id. at 1350.
92. Id.
93. 444 U.S. at 215.
94. Id. at 216 (footnote omitted).
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which provides that a union is bound by the acts of its agents"
and section 301(e) which requires that agency be determined by
the common law of agency." The Court concluded that holding the
parent union liable in the face of Congress' clear statement on the
limits of union responsibility would be "anomalous '1 7 and would
"pierce the shield that Congress took such care to construct." 8
The Court acknowledged the legislative policy of favoring arbi-
tration, but rejected the assertion that such a policy required an
implied obligation on the part of the parent union to end strikes in
derogation of its authority.9 It was noted that a policy of "particu-
lar importance" which the Taft-Hartley Act sought to promote was
the policy of free collective bargaining.100 The Fourth Circuit's
finding that the parties had directly addressed the issue in prior
contracts, but had specifically deleted it from the controlling
agreement was cited by the Supreme Court as indicative of the
parties' intent.10 1 The Court concluded: "It would do violence to
the bargaining process and the national policy furthering free col-
lective bargaining to impose by judicial implication a duty ...
that the parties in arms-length bargaining first included and then
purposely deleted."10' 2
IV. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling in Carbon Fuel, the
Sixth Circuit decided United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain.103
95. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976). See note 65 supra.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1976). See note 65 supra. The remarks of Senator Taft in ex-
plaining section 301(e) were recalled by the Court:
If the wife of a man who is working at a plant receives a lot of telephone messages,
very likely it cannot be proved that they came from the union. There is no case then.
There must be legal proof of agency in the case of unions as in the case of
corporations ...
444 U.S. at 217 (emphasis in original) (quoting Senator Taft in 93 Cong. Rec. 4022 (1947)).
97. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. at 217-18.
98. Id. at 218.
99. Id. at 216.
100. Id. at 218. See notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text. But see United Steel-
workers of America v. Lorain, 616 F.2d at 922 (6th Cir. 1980) (the court failed to recognize
an express agreement by the parties that the union would "actively discourage and endeavor
to prevent or terminate" strikes in breach of the contract).
101. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. at 219-20.
102. Id. at 221-22.
103. 616 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3018 (May 6,1980)
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Lorain involved a wildcat strike by members of a union local in
breach of their collective bargaining agreement which provided for
an employee grievance procedure that included mandatory arbitra-
tion.104 The contract also contained a promise by the union to "ac-
tively discourage and endeavor to prevent or terminate" any
strike. 10 5 After most of the workers walked off the job and the
union had abandoned its efforts to end the work stoppage, the em-
ployer instituted a suit against both the local and the parent union
for damages caused by the wildcat strike.106
The trial court held that the local union, because it was not a
party signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, was not lia-
ble for a breach of that contract.10 The court did, however, find
that the local officers were acting as authorized agents of the Inter-
national in their activities during the wildcat strike' 0' and that
"the International through acts of omission and commission ...
breached its contractual mandate to 'actively discourage and en-
deavor to terminate' any such unlawful strike."' 0' The court found
(U.S. No. 80-56).
104. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, No. 1-76-145, slip op. at 2-3 (E.D. Tenn.
June 27, 1977).
105. Id. The International was a party signatory to the contract and thus liable for
breach of its provisions. Id.
106. The walkout commenced on the morning of Thursday, July 15, 1976 after an infor-
mal discussion of certain employee grievances. Local union officers were not involved inini-
tiating or encouraging the walkout and in fact sought to dissuade the employees by re-
minding them of the no-strike obligation under the contract. During the afternoon following
the walkout, efforts by the local officers to induce the wildcatting employees to return to
work consisted mainly of attempting to negotiate the strikers' grievance with the company.
On Friday, the second day of the strike, all of the local union officers remained off the job,
but did meet with the company again to seek a negotiation of the employee grievances. Also
on Friday, the International's president sent a telegram urging the striking local members to
return to work. Representatives of the International also met with the strikers and local
officials on Sunday to urge the strikers to return to work, but the meeting was adjourned
without success. After this meeting, all further dttempts on the part of local officials and the
parent union to "lead, urge, advise, admonish, or discipline" the wildcatting employees to
end their strike were ceased. Id. at 5. On both Monday and Tuesday following the walkout
an International representative informed the company that none of the local officials would
report to work and that no union representative would cross the picket line for negotiations.
A temporary restraining order was obtained by the company on Tuesday afternoon and all
employees returned to work on Wednesday, July 21. Id. at 7.
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id. at 8.
109. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, No. 1-76-45, slip op. at 21-22 (E.D. Tenn.
April 8, 1977).
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that the union's failure to take action after the Sunday following
the walkout constituted "passive acquiesence" in the strike and
that this acquiesence, along with the local's efforts to negotiate the
strikers' grievances, constituted a ratification by the parent union
of the illegal strike. 110 The court also invoked the mass action the-
ory"' and the Eazor Express doctrine of an implied duty of affirm-
ative efforts" 2 to implicate the International in the ratification of
the strike."'
Finally, the district court held that the International's failure to
take any action in the final two days of the strike, thereby casting
the entire burden on the company to end the strike, was a breach
of its express promise to "actively discourage and endeavor to...
terminate any stoppage. . . .,, The district court found that this
promise imposed a duty on the union, not only to refrain from ini-
tiating or authorizing a strike, but to use all available means to
terminate an unauthorized strike."' The obligation to use all avail-
able means was held to require more than just "rhetoric," but to
include internal union action against the strikers such as fines, sus-
pensions, expulsion, and any other penalties provided for by the
union constitution.' The district court emphasized that any one
of the several bases on which it found the International liable was
in itself legally sufficient to support liability.'1 7
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court holding
that the International had ratified the walkout.1 8 The court held
that the union was under no duty to take affirmative steps' 1' and
that the union's inactivity in the final two days of the strike, ab-
sent such a duty, could not constitute a ratification of the wildcat
strike. 120 The court also overturned the lower court's ruling that
110. Id. at 28.
111. Id. at 23-24. See notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 24. See notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text.
113. Although both of these doctrines were rendered invalid by the Supreme Court in
Carbon Fuel, the district court emphasized that the language of the express provision alone
was sufficient to create an affirmative duty on the part of the parent union. Id. at 30.
114. Id. at 27.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 25.
117. Id. at 30.
118. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, 616 F.2d at 922-24.
119. Id. at 921.
120. Id. at 922.
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the union's failure to discipline the strikers and its attempts at ne-
gotiating their grievances with the company during the strike were
acts of ratification. 2 1
In addition, the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding
that the International had an express duty under the collective
bargaining agreement to take action to end the strike.22 The court
reinterpreted the no-strike clause and held that no affirmative
duty was established by its terms because the phrase "actively dis-
courage and endeavor to prevent or terminate any stoppage" was
not specific enough to impose an obligation.2 2 The court stated
that it would be "inappropriate" to find that this clause created a
liability for damages because it appears with the phrase "participa-
tion in such activities [unauthorized interruptions of work] shall
result in discharge of all those employees responsible for such oc-
currences ... ."124 An additional reason was that the promise to
actively terminate served "a function, separate and apart from the
question of defining standards of conduct which will subject the
union to damages."2 The court did not articulate what it in-
tended this separate function to be, but it is apparent from the
holding of the Sixth Circuit that the clause requiring the union to
endeavor to terminate strikes was rendered meaningless. This con-
struction is contrary to the rule that "a court should strive to give
meaning to every provision in a contract.' ' 2 6
Rather than give effect to the language of the no-strike clause
which required the union to "actively discourage and endeavor to
prevent or terminate" strikes, the Lorain court emphasized an ex-
121. Id. at 923. The duty not to ratify a strike in breach of the contract is distinct from
the duty to intervene to end wildcat strikes. However, inadequacy of a union's efforts to end
strikes has been held to be evidence of ratification. Riverton Coal Co. v. UMW, 453 F.2d
1035, 1042 (6th Cir. 1972); Local Union 984, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d
231, 242 (6th Cir. 1961); Oxco Brush Div., Vistron Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machin-
ists, 93 L.R.R.M. 2721, 2727 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). See also note 66 supra.
122. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, 616 F.2d at 922.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 920, 922.
125. Id. at 922.
126. Willo Packing Co. ,v. Butchers, Foodhandlers, and Allied Workers Union, 450 F.
Supp. 598, 601 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(a) (1932) ("An
interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations
of intention is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations
unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect."); accord 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 546 (1960).
1981] 1075
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
culpatory clause which disclaimed union liability for damages for
unauthorized strikes."2 7 The court held that because this exculpa-
tory clause was the only portion of the no-strike provision which
specifically mentioned damages, those words alone defined the ex-
tent of the union's duty under the contract. 2 The Sixth Circuit's
holding is a reversal of the district court's finding that "such lan-
guage of exculpation does not, on its face, purport to release the
International from its own specific promise that there will be no
strikes without first fulfilling . . . their contractual . . . obligations
of affirmative action."' ' The district court read the no-strike
clause as containing two distinct promises: a promise to refrain
from authorizing or ratifying a work stoppage and a promise to
"endeavor to terminate" any wildcat work stoppage. The explicit
language providing for an affirmative duty should not be ignored in
favor of a general disclaimer of liability for unauthorized strikes. 80
A. No-Strike Clause Constructions By Other Courts
The Sixth Circuit's construction of the no-strike clause in Lorain
is inconsistent with interpretations of similar provisions by other
courts. One of the decisions cited by the Sixth Circuit in support of
its conclusion that the terms of the no-strike provision were not
specific enough to create an affirmative duty was Penn Packing Co.
v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters.13
In Penn Packing, the collective bargaining agreement contained
a promise by the union that it "guarantee [d]" there would be no
strike.' 2 The Third Circuit held that the term "guarantees" was
not specific enough to create strict liability on the part of the
127. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, 616 F.2d at 920. The exculpatory clause
provided that "[t]he Union shall not be liable for monetary damages for unauthorized
strikes. . . ." Id.
128. Id. at 922.
129. No. 1-76-145, slip op. at 26-27 (E.D. Tenn. April 8, 1977). Cf. Eazor Express, Inc. v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp. at 168 n.17 (Disclaimers by the International
union of liability for breach of contract by its locals appearing in the collective bargaining
agreement were held to be "mere ineffectual contrivances.").
130. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(c) (1932). "Where there is an inconsistency be-
tween general provisions and specific provisions, the specific provisions ordinarily qualify
the meaning of the general provisions."
131.. 497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974).
132. Id. at 890. "The union for itself and for its individual members agrees and guaran-
tees that there shall be no strike. . . ." Id.
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union for an unauthorized strike. 183 In dictum, however, the court
implied that the union's promise created an affirmative duty to at-
tempt to end the strike.'" The court found that because union offi-
cials had exercized every available means to end the strike, the
union had not breached any duty it may have had under the con-
tract.1 33 It was also stressed that courts must "interpret the words
in a contract of this nature to give them their ordinary and reason-
able meaning." 136 The requirement of specific language in Penn
Packing was applied only to the creation of strict liability on the
part of the union for strikes and, therefore, does not support the
Sixth Circuit's finding in Lorain that the promise to "actively en-
deavor to prevent or terminate" is so general as to create no duty.
Another decision cited by the Sixth Circuit in Lorain was Latas
Libby's, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America.3 7 The collective
bargaining agreement in Latas Libby's contained the following
promise: "No officer or representative of the union or employee
shall authorize, instigate aid or condone, any [work stoppage] dur-
ing the life of this Agreement."'" The First Circuit interpreted the
promise not to "condone" as creating an affirmative duty on the
part of the parent union to attempt to induce its membership to
end a wildcat strike.'" The court emphasized that the clause "de-
scribes with particularity the union's responsibilities to avoid
strikes.""" In comparison with the language of the no-strike provi-
sion in Lorain, the clause in the Latas Libby's contract is consider-
ably less precise and the interpretation of the Lorain court is
therefore clearly in conflict with the ruling of the First Circuit in
Latas Libby's.
Another example of a provision which was held to create an obli-
gation of affirmative action on the part of the union is the no-
133. Id. at 891.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (footnote omitted).
137. 609 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 944 (1980).
138. Id. at 26.
139. Id. at 29. "[It [is] clear that this language imposes an obligation on the Union to
take some affirmative steps toward ending a strike. We need not explore the limits of this
obligation, for the Union . ..made only the most minimal effort to end this strike." Id.
140. Id. at 28.
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strike clause in Airco Speer Carbon-Graphite v. Local 502.141 In
Airco, the union promised to "cooperate with the Company in
every way possible to prevent any such stoppages of work-and to
terminate such stoppages that may occur as soon as possible."14 2
The district court construed the term "cooperate" to create an ob-
ligation on the part of the union to initiate action to get its mem-
bership back to work. "[T]he express terms of the clause prohibit
the union from disregarding a strike and permitting its continu-
ance, once it has commenced, regardless of whether the union itself
instigated the strike."4 s
A court can determine the meaning of an express no-strike
clause by examining the language and structure of the clause, the
bargaining history of the parties, and any relevant conduct that
shows the parties' understanding of the contract.' 4 Because there
was no evidence offered in Lorain concerning the parties' bargain-
ing history or any other relevant extrinsic evidence as to the intent
of the parties, the language and the context of the no-strike clause
should have been determinative. 146 In light of the enforcement of
the promise to "cooperate" in Airco and the promise not to "con-
done" in Latas Libby's, the holding by the Sixth Circuit in Lorain
that the terms "actively discourage and endeavor to prevent or ter-
minate" a strike were not specific enough to create a duty on the
part of the union is unfounded. The clauses enforced in Airco and
Latas Libby's were substantially less explicit than the unambigu-
ous terms of the no-strike clause in Lorain. The construction of a
no-strike clause should involve "a realistic reading of that clause in
light of the range of pressures and policies which impinge on col-
lective bargaining. '"I" Such a construction must involve a recogni-
141. 494 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
142. Id. at 875.
143. Id.
144. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamster Locals, 624 F.2d 1182, 1185
(3d Cir. 1980). See also Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. at 219-22 (the Court considered
extrinsic. evidence, including the bargaining history of the parties, to interpret the contract);
Old Ben Coal Corp. v. UMW, 457 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1972) (the court considered the
bargaining history of the parties).
145. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamster Locals, 624 F.2d at 1185.
146. Wildcat Strikes, supra note 7, at 477. See Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 495 F. Supp. 619, 636 (M.D.N.C. 1980) ("[In determining rights
and duties in a collective bargaining agreement, the court must always consider national
labor policy.").
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tion of the nature of the quid pro quo exchange and the effect a
promise of affirmative action has on that exchange. 7 In view of
the explicit language of the clause in Lorain and the policies of
promoting arbitration and industrial peace which permeate Con-
gressional labor legislation, 4 8 the meaning of the Lorain no-strike
provision must be that it creates an affirmative obligation on the
part of the union to attempt to end unauthorized work stoppages.
B. Lorain and Federal Labor Policy
The failure of the Sixth Circuit in Lorain to find an affirmative
duty on the part of the union is fundamentally in conflict with the
important policies which Congress sought to promote through the
Taft-Hartley Act. One of the major objectives of section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act was "to promote and make effective" the quid
pro quo exchange of employee grievance arbitration and the prom-
ise not to strike.1 49 By insuring the effectiveness of this quid pro
quo agreement, Congress sought to stabilize industrial relations
and to decrease the incidence of economic warfare over labor dis-
putes. "'5 It was recognized that "(t]he execution of an agreement
does not by itself promote industrial peace."'' Thus, judicial con-
struction and enforcement should reflect the aims of federal labor
policy as well as an analysis of the language of the contract.'5 2 Spe-
cifically, interpretation of the scope of a no-strike clause should
reflect the policy of insuring the effectiveness of the union's prom-
ise not to strike. 1 The goals of stable labor-management relations
147. See Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamster Locals, 624 F.2d at 1188
(The court interpreted the scope of a no-strike clause in the context of the quid pro quo
exchange.) See notes 24-40 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
150. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 16.
151. Id. "We shall have to find methods not only of peaceful negotiation of labor con-
tracts, but also of insuring industrial peace for the lifetime of such contracts. . . there must
be responsibility and integrity on both sides in carrying them out." Id. (quoting an address
by President Truman).
152. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Local Lodge No. 1717, 299 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1962). "The
better construction [is] . . . to construe the words and phrases of this agreement so that the
no-strike provision shall . . . be in conformity with an enlightened labor and management
federal policy." Id. at 888.
153. "[L]abor agreements must 'always be construed with that expectation or end [of
labor peace] in mind." Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp.
at 164.
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and industrial peace are defeated when union members strike in
derrogation of the authority of their union.15 4 Unauthorized work
stoppages tend to undermine the stabilizing effect of the quid pro
quo agreement because the employer is not getting what it bar-
gained for and has no effective remedy against the perpetrators of
the wildcat strike.155 The recognition of an express provision creat-
ing an obligation on the part of the union to take affirmative steps
to end an unauthorized work stoppage is therefore mandated in
light of federal policy. The Supreme Court has proscribed "free-
wheeling" disregard for congressional policies in the enforcement
of collective labor agreements. 1 68 "Lincoln Mills makes clear that
this federal common law [regarding labor contract enforcement]
must be 'fashion[ed] from the policy of our national labor
laws.' ,1"'5
Any ambiguity in the language of the no-strike agreement re-
garding the creation of the union's affirmative duty to try to end
wildcat strikes should be resolved in favor of the avowed federal
policies of preserving an effective quid pro quo exchange of the
promise to arbitrate and the promise not to strike and of fostering
stable and peaceful labor-management relations. 58 Although there
is no compulsion to agree to any provision, be it grievance arbitra-
tion, a no-strike clause, or a promise to take affirmative steps to-
ward ending wildcat strikes, federal courts have demonstrated a
willingness to fashion rules of labor contract construction which
gi;ve generous scope to these promises when they appear in collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 5 9 While the Supreme Court has em-
154. See notes 27, 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
155. See Note, The Enforceability of the No-Strike and Interest Arbitration Provisions
of the Experimental Negotiating Agreement in Federal Courts, 12 VAL. L. REV. 57, 70-71
(1977) [hereinafter cited as The Enforceability of the No-Strike Provision]. "[Als a matter
of public policy it is desirable to impose an obligation upon a union to take steps to frus-
trate its members from doing that which it is contractually prohibited from doing as an
entity." Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp. at 165. See
also notes 13, 27 supra and accompanying text.
156. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 255 (1974).
157. Id. at 255 (quoting from Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456).
158. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
159. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks' Local 770, 388 U.S. 235 (1970); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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phasized the importance of maintaining free collective bargain-
ing, 160 "it also makes it clear that the collective bargaining
agreement is not an ordinary contract to be governed by ordinary
principles of contract law and that these principles must be ad-
justed in light of the imperatives of federal labor policy ... "1
Federal labor policy clearly requires the recognition of an affirma-
tive obligation by the union to intervene during wildcat strikes
where it expressly agrees to such a duty. 62
V. The Policies Underlying the Circuit Court's Holding
in Lorain
Although the Sixth Circuit in Lorain conceded that a union
could expressly agree to assume an obligation to take affirmative
steps to end wildcat strikes, " its construction of the no-strike
clause belies such a statement. The court stated that "[iut is not
the law in this circuit that a union is required to take affirmative
action to end a strike, absent exceptional circumstances.1 6" The
court did not address the question of whether an express promise
by the union constitutes an "exceptional circumstance." Implicit in
the court's construction of the no-strike clause, however, was the
notion that "[iut is not the union's role to act as an agent of the
employer, to perform acts the employer requires, but to be the rep-
resentative of its members."16 The court implied that enforcement
of an affirmative duty on the part of a union is inapposite to its
160. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979); Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414
U.S. 368 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); H. K. Porter
Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
161. R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 549 (1976). See also Reflections, supra note 35, at 1490-93.
"Collective agreements, because of... [their] institutional characteristics . . . are less com-
plete and more loosely drawn than many other contracts; therefore, there is much more to
be supplied from the context in which they were negotiated." Id. at 1500.
162. The policies of industrial peace and of support for the arbitration process support
the finding of an affirmative duty on the part of the union to end strikes as an effective
method for curbing unauthorized strikes. Where the parties have expressly agreed to such
an arrangement, the policy of allowing the parties to freely determine the terms and condi-
tions of employment mandates the enforcement of such an agreement. See notes 26-40
supra and accompanying text.
163. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, 616 F.2d at 922.
164. Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
165. Id.
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position as collective bargaining representative.
The Sixth Circuit's concern for the "role" of the union is not
unfounded. Affirmative steps seen as pro-management action by
employees may tend to fractionate a union during a wildcat
strike1" because a true wildcat strike is, to some extent, a rebellion
against the authority of the union as well as against the em-
ployer.167 Factionalism within a union could exacerbate an already
inflamed wildcat situation and make effective compromise more
difficult.1'" Both the union and the employer suffer when the rep-
resentation process breaks down. 69 Also, the union may not neces-
sarily have the loyalty of all employees.17 0 Hostile groups within
the bargaining unit may seek to expose the union to liability.1
7 1
Ultimately, excessive interference with the self-help efforts of wild-
caters may antagonize local membership and even provoke disaffil-
iation of the local from the parent union.
7 2
On the other hand, inaction by the parent union or perfunctory
warnings and mere lip service to the no-strike promise are of little
value in curtailing wildcat strikes. The ravages of a prolonged
strike are an anathema to both workers and management. "While
[a wildcat strike] . .. lets off emotional steam and dramatizes
grievances, it can result in excessive loss to the company [and to
employees]. . .. ,,17" Many employers suffer irreparable harm due
to unauthorized work stoppages.174 In addition to lost production,
the wildcat strike creates uncertainty. Foreign competitors who are
not hampered by the threat of strike may be encouraged to enter
the market of a company whose production is subject to interrup-
166. See Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 74-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8092 (1974); Wild-
cat Strikes, supra note 7, at 481-82.
167. See note 9 supra.
168. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comm. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 68-69
(1975).
169. Wildcat Strikes, supra note 7, at 481-82. See Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 74-1 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 8092, 3340 (1974) ("Overkill" is likely to destroy the union as an
effective leader and representative, leaving neither the employer nor the union with any
influence over wildcat strikers.).
170. Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 672, 701 (1967).
171. Id. at 702.
172. Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1043-44.
173. Handsaker, Remedies and Penalties for Wildcat Strikes: How Arbitrators and Fed-
eral Courts Have Ruled, 22 CATH. U. L. REv. 279, 321 (1973).
174. See The Enforceability of the No-Strike Provisions, supra note 155, at 64.
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tion by illegal strikes.""5 Another important reason for avoiding
wildcat strikes is the undermining effect it has on the grievance
procedure. 176 When the parent union fails to exercise the powers it
has under its constitution to end a wildcat strike, employees tend
to perceive this inaction as tacit support.17 At best, refusal to take
affirmative steps is seen as "passive acquiesence" by the strikers.1 7,
At worst, perfunctory notices urging a return to work can actually
be interpreted as covert authorization of the strike. 179 Subtle clues
in official messages may indicate the parent union's "unofficial"
position. "If a nod or a wink or a code was used in place of the
word 'strike,' there was just as much a strike called as if the word
'strike' had been used."180 Thus, the no-strike clause bargained for'
by the employer is meaningless where the parent union implies its
support for a wildcat strike by its failure to take steps which it is
empowered to take to bring the strike to an end. 81 Moreover,
where an affirmative duty is expressly bargained for in the agree-
ment, failure to enforce it is contrary to the important principle of
freedom of contract and likely to damage the confidence an em-
ployer has in the collective bargaining process.18 2
175. Id.
176. See note 13, supra and accompanying text.
177. See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695, 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 876 (1977); Oxco Brush Div., Vistron Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 93
L.R.R.M. 2721, 2725-26 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1045-
46.
178. See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d at 701; Eazor Express, Inc. v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d at 964; Riverton Coal Co. v. UMW, 453 F.2d at 1042;
Local Union 984, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d 231, 242 (6th Cir. 1961).
179. See Oxco Brush Div., Vistron Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 93
L.R.R.M. 2721, 2726 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (jury charge required consideration of whether
union's inaction was a form of persuasion to continue work stoppage).
180. United States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948), afj'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949). See also United Textile Workers, Local 120 v. New-
berry Mills, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 366, 372-73 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
181. Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1048.
182. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text. See Republic Steel Corp. v. UMW,
570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978).
The international union simply must bear certain obligations if it is to continue to be
entitled to the rights and benefits accorded by our national labor policy. To the ex-
tent that any union ... refuses to enforce appropriately authorized union discipline
upon recalcitrant members who violate . . . collective bargaining agreements ...
that union can be said to have abrogated a proportion of valued rights granted to the
union under national labor policy.
Id. at 479. Strikes in breach of contract are unprotected activity and an employer has the
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VI. The Standard of All Reasonable Means
A crucial issue is the standard by which a union's conduct
should be measured in determining whether its duty of affirmative
action has been fulfilled.a A proper standard can significantly
mitigate the threat of destabilizing a union while still allowing
meaningful enforcement of the union's duty to intervene during
wildcat strikes. A duty of "all reasonable means"-the steps that a
reasonable union leader, in good faith, would take under the cir-
cumstances's-would allow a union official to balance the poten-
tial benefits of his actions in trying to end a strike with the risk of
exacerbating the wildcat rebellion or unreasonably jeopardizing the
union's relationship with its local membership. 85 A union should
not be held to have agreed to a duty under the contract which
would endanger its affiliation with a local;8'e and an employer
should not be held to have intended to compel a union to take
power to discharge employees who engage in such strikes. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306
U.S. 332 (1939); Lewis v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, 407 F.2d
1185 (3d Cir. 1969). However, discharge of all strikers may further disrupt production and
discriminatory discharge of strike leaders may be an unfair labor practice. See Parent
Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1029-30. See also ITT Abrasive Prod. Co. 72-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8104 (1972) (Discriminatorily discharged leaders of a work stoppage were
ordered reinstated by arbitrator).
183. The extent of a union's duty of intervention can be made explicit in the collective
bargaining agreement. The union is liable for fulfillment of the duty it agrees to assume. See
notes 39, 144-47 supra and accompanying text.
184. See also Adley Express Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107, 349 F. Supp. 436,
444 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (the court applied a standard of "very substantial and sincere" efforts,
steps "which could reasonably be expected to effectuate a return to work."). Cf. W. PROSSER,
J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 195 (6th ed. 1976) (part of the
standard of care for professionals in actions for negligence is "the exercise of a discerning
judgment in the exercise of a reasonable discretion").
185. See Oxco Brush Div., Vistron Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 93
L.R.R.M. at 2725-26. (The charge to the jury required consideration of whether the steps
taken by a union were in good faith, "based upon expertise and experience in an effort
solely to reduce friction" or merely "token lip service."); Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 74-1
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8092 (1974). The arbitrator in Dolly Madison stated that a duty
to use reasonable means required:
[That] a union . . . ha[s] some flexibility based upon the circumstances of the strike
to detemine for itself the means which would be most likely not only to end the strike
as rapidly as possible, but also to preserve the union's power to continue to effectively
and responsibly represent and lead the employees in its continuing collective bargain-
ing relationship with the employer.
Id. at 3340. See also Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1046-47.
186. See Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1048.
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action which would foreseeably aggravate an unauthorized work
stoppage. A union, therefore, should be liable for breach of its ex-
press promise to the extent that its efforts are unreasonably inade-
quate under the circumstances.'87
To be distinguished is the standard of "all reasonable means"
enforced by the court in Eazor Express.'5 8 It has been argued that
the Eazor standard would be more accurately described as a duty
of "all possible means."'' "The obligation is not discretionary, but
mandatory. Therefore, it leaves no latitude for political or even
good faith judgments as to what might and what might not be pro-
ductive."190 The court advocated the "politics of power rather than
the politics of persuasion."' Such an approach is too rigid for the
delicate task of balancing policies to achieve stable labor-manage-
ment relations. 192
The range of actions that can be taken by a union to induce its
membership to return to work is broad." s At a minimum, a union
187. See Oxco Brush Div., Vistron Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 93
L.R.R.M. at 2725-26; Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 74-1 Lab. Arb. Awards 8092 (1974); Par-
ent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1048. Cf. HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d
77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1966) (not best efforts, but only good faith required where a party con-
tracted to promote and distribute a product); Neofotistos v. Harvard Brewing Co., 341
Mass. 684, 171 N.E.2d 865 (1961) (discontinuance of production in good faith not a breach
of output contract). See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 170-71
(2d ed. 1977); 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 569 (1960).
188. 357 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
189. Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1044.
190. Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp. at 168 n.18.
191. Id. at 167. The violence which occurred during the strike may have been a factor in
the Eazor court's adoption of this standard. See Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 74-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 1 8092, 3340 (1974).
192. Wildcat Strikes, supra note 7, at 492. See Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 74-1 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 8092 (1974) ("[Ljong range labor relations would (not] be best served
by an unwaivering ... obligation that a union use every weapon at its command at the very
outset of a wildcat strike regardless of other facts and circumstances. Such [an approach
would be] overkill .. " Id. at 3340.).
193. Disciplinary action by the union against its membership must be in accordance with
the constitution and by-laws of the union. Many constitutions permit the union to discipline
members who impair the union's contractual obligations, such as the no-strike clause. See
Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1039; Connolly, supra note 28, at 286. See, e.g.,
Burke v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 6, 302 F. Supp. 1345, 1350-51 (N.D. Cal.
1967), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1969). Procedural due process must be ob-
served whenever a union fines, suspends, expels or otherwise disciplines a member, except
for nonpayment of dues. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976). See, e.g., Gabaner v. Woodcock, 520
F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976); Tincher v. Piasecki, 520 F.2d
851 (7th Cir. 1975).
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may publicly disavow an unauthorized work stoppage or order its
membership back to work. 194 However, simple exhortation by the
union is often ineffective.' 5 At the other extreme, a union may ex-
pel a wildcat striker. 196 Expulsion is often as undesired by the em-
ployer as it is by the employee and should therefore be used only
as a last resort.197 Suspension from the union is another possible
step. In Eazor Express, the court suggested that the "books" of
wildcat strikers be lifted or union hall hiring facilities be withheld
so that they could not work elsewhere during the strike.' 8 Where
local officers participate in the strike, a parent union may, in accor-
dance with its constitution and by-laws, strip such local officers of
their authority and create a trusteeship over the local in order to
end a strike in breach of contract.19 Denial of access to local union
facilities through the imposition of a trusteeship may be effective
in curtailing the operation of a wildcat strike.2 00 The union may
also be able to impose financial sanctions, such as fines2 0' or the
withholding of strike fund benefits.2 0 2 Arranging for a secret ballot
vote on ending the strike may be all that is needed in some
cases.
2 0o
194. In a national sampling of labor agreements, 13% of all collective bargaining con-
tracts required express disavowal and 32% required the union to order a return to work.
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 93 (8th ed. 1975).
195. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, 616 F.2d at 921; Riverton Coal
Co. v. UMW, 453 F.2d at 1042.
196. See, e.g., Farowitz v. Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y., Local 812, 330 F.2d 999
(2d Cir. 1964). Pearl v. Tarantola, 361 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Nix v. Fulton Lodge
No. 2, 262 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (N.D. Ga. 1967), modified, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 946 (1972).
197. Union expulsion of local members is the type of action most likely to trigger insta-
bility in parent union-local relations. See Note, Considerations in Disciplining Employees
for Participation in Violations of the No-Strike Clause, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 999, 1003
(1958).
198. 357 F. Supp. at 167. See Lakeshore Motor Freight Co. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 800, 483 F. Supp. 1150, 1152 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
199. See 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). See, e.g., Murphy v. American Fed'n of Grain Millers,
Local No. 6, 261 N.W. 2d 496, 499 (1978). National Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto,
449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971); Jolly v. Gorman, 428 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1023 (1971).
200. Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1038.
201. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967).
202. See Parent Union Liability, supra note 6, at 1040.
203. In Eazor, one of the wildcatting locals returned to work after the first secret ballot
vote by the strikers. 357 F. Supp. at 166 n.14.
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The "politics of persuasion" should be considered in employing
the various means available to the union.0 4 Union action to end a
strike should be coercive rather than punitive. The risks and possi-
ble benefits of union action, as well as the extent of the union's
disciplinary powers under its constitution and by-laws, must be
weighed in determining the reasonableness of its action or inaction.
A union must therefore have the opportunity to employ good faith
discretion in deciding the manner and extent of its intervention. In
short, where the union has expressly agreed to intervene, parent
union officials must function as effective union leaders as well as
responsible parties to collective labor agreements in cooperating
with the employer to induce an end to unauthorized work stop-
pages.2 0 5 Such cooperation between the union and the employer is
a natural and necessary step in the maturation of labor-manage-
ment relations.
VII. Conclusion
An express promise by the union to take steps to induce an end
to unauthorized work stoppages, such as the provision in United
Steelworkers of America v. Lorain should be enforced by the
courts. The Lorain court's holding was objectionable not only be-
cause of its unsound construction of the no-strike clause, but also
because of its fundamental inconsistency with the legislative pur-
pose of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Upholding the union's
affirmative duty is also mandated by the Supreme Court's avowed
policy of broadly construing the quid pro quo exchange of griev-
ance arbitration and the promise not to strike in collective bargain-
ing agreements. The enforcement of an affirmative duty of inter-
vention does not undermine the union's position as the
representative of its membership where it can exercise good faith
204. See, e.g., Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 195, 497 F.2d at
890 (The union persuaded workers who were protesting the suspension of an employee to
return to work by paying the salary of the suspended employee during the arbitration of the
grievance.) Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. at 214 n.1. (Through frequent meetings with
strikers and threats of discipline, the union ended most of 48 unauthorized work stoppages
within one or two days. To avoid aggravating worker unrest, however, the union chose not to
take any disciplinary action.).
205. An active role in the resolution of unauthorized strikes is not infrequently resorted
to by unions, even where they have no contractual obligation to do so. See A. GOLDMAN,
LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 261 (1979).
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discretion in taking appropriate and reasonable steps to end a
strike. Where it is expressly provided for in the contract, reasona-
ble cooperation should be deemed part of the quid pro quo
exchange.
Thomas Kevin Sheehy
